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Abstract
How do workers and firms respond to comprehensive labor market reforms? We use detailed
micro data to analyze the German Hartz Reforms through the lens of a structural model of
the labor market. These reforms aimed at reducing unemployment, by increasing working hour
flexibility, job matching and work incentives. In our setting, reforms directly affect the model
parameters, which are estimated using matched data on 430,000 workers in 340,000 firms. Con-
trary to previous findings, our analysis shows that, although the reforms shortened the typical
duration of unemployment, they did not reduce unemployment as a whole and led to a decline in
wages. Low-skilled workers suffered the most in terms of employment and wage losses. Further-
more, we decompose the contribution of each reform wave to employment and wage changes,
finding that the reduction in generosity of unemployment benefits was the principle driver in
reducing wages.
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1 Introduction
This paper evaluates the wage and employment impacts of a series of German labor market reforms
using detailed worker-firm micro data. The so-called Hartz reforms were implemented from 2003-
2005 and are particularly difficult to evaluate: they were anticipated, multifaceted in their scope,
likely to have large general equilibrium effects, and were implemented during an expansionary
time for Germany. We build a structural model of the labor market with forward-looking agents
in which the reforms govern the primitive structural parameters of the model. Parameters are
identified through the timing of reform implementations. Using our estimated model we simulate
the impacts of the policies absent other economic changes, so we can isolate the overall effect as
well as individual impacts of specific policies. We find that jointly the policies did not increase
employment but resulted in a reduction of wages of around 4%. This fall in wages is mostly driven
by the reform that reduced the generosity of unemployment benefits. Further, we find that the
decline in wages disproportionally affected low-skilled workers.
The German labor market reforms in the early 2000s are often referred to as exemplary poli-
cies for reducing unemployment. After lackluster economic growth in the 1990s and early 2000s,
Germany outperformed many other industrialized countries from 2006 onwards and during the
Great Recession. Unemployment fell from 12.3% in 1998 to 8.7% in 2008, and Germany attracted
international attention for its transformation from the ‘sick man of Europe to economic superstar’
(Dustmann et al., 2014). However, the extent to which the Hartz reforms altered the performance
of the German labor market, and how they affected unemployment and wages, remains unclear.
In particular, the decrease in unemployment is often attributed to the Hartz reforms. Other less
prominent explanations for the strengthening of the German economy include pre-reform wage
moderation and a favorable export environment. The Hartz reforms consisted of three waves which
were implemented annually from 2003 to 2005. The first wave had the objective of stimulating
labor demand, mostly through tax breaks for part-time work. The second reform wave aimed at
improving labor market efficiency through better matching of workers and firms, and the final wave
introduced a series of supply-side policies that disincentivized unemployment.
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Our paper contributes to an extensive literature on the link between the rigidity of labor market
institutions, unemployment and wages. In the context of the German Hartz reforms, two types
of studies exist that investigate specific subsets of the reform policies. A number of structural
macroeconomic papers explicitly model certain reform aspects (for example, Krause and Uhlig,
2012; Krebs and Scheffel, 2013; Launov and Wälde, 2013, 2016), and find declines of unemployment
in response to the second and third reform waves that vary in size, and mixed evidence on wages.
Typically these papers are calibrated or estimated using pre-reform data and explicitly model spe-
cific reform features. On the other hand, reduced-form approaches use discontinuities or structural
breaks to analyze specific reform policies (for instance, Fahr and Sunde, 2009; Klinger and Rothe,
2012; Hertweck and Sigrist, 2013; Price, 2018; Tazhitdinova, 2018). These studies broadly indicate
small declines in unemployment in response to each of the Hartz policies. Our paper differs from
these papers by exploiting detailed micro data for evaluating the effects of the Hartz policies jointly
in the presence of interacting labor market institutions. By imposing structure on the data gener-
ating process, we provide insights into the mechanisms and outcomes of Germany’s transition to a
more flexible labor market.
Our work builds on the literature of labor market equilibrium models and in particular on the
sequential auction model in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). In our framework, wage determination
is tractable out of steady-state as in Postel-Vinay and Turon (2010) and Lise and Robin (2017).
We extend the framework in Lise and Robin (2017) by including a match-specific component, a
wage setting mechanism that can replicate the empirical wage distribution, and shocks that affect
the parameter space rather than labor productivity. Equilibrium labor market models with search
frictions are used to evaluate specific policies (for example, Bentolila et al., 2012; Bradley et al., 2017;
Shephard, 2017), but this methodology cannot be easily expanded for investigating labor market
reforms with extensive scope or when policies lack a clear evaluation metric. In a similar approach
to our paper, Murtin and Robin (2018) develop and estimate a structural model of labor markets,
with changes in policies as reduced-form effects on the structural parameters.1 Their model focuses
1This structural and reduced-form hybrid approach is not new. In the discrete choice literature the approach was
pioneered by Keane and Moffitt (1998), and more recently, Blundell and Shephard (2012) model the stigma associated
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on employment and its volatility, and is estimated for nine OECD countries. Dispersion in labor
market policies across these countries maps to differences in structural parameters. By contrast,
our paper identifies changes in parameters from the timing of policy reforms within a single country,
with policy effects on the distribution of wages in addition to employment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the Hartz reforms, summa-
rizes the evolution of employment and wages over the reform periods, and motivates our conceptual
approach. Section 3 describes the model. The estimation protocol is presented in Section 4. Section
5 discusses the estimation results and simulates the model to uncover the reform impacts on wages
and employment. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Hartz Reforms
The Hartz reforms consist of four labor market reform laws that were implemented in Germany be-
tween 2003 and 2005. The main objective of the reforms was to reduce unemployment. To reach this
objective the reforms included extensive changes for workers and firms, such as increased working
hour flexibility, improved job matching, and more stringent work incentives for the unemployed.
The Hartz laws were based on suggestions by the Commission for Modern Services in the Labor
Market, also called the Hartz Commission. After years of rising unemployment, labor market policy
was a central issue in the German elections in 1998 and 2002. When unemployment remained high,
the Hartz Commission was appointed on February 22nd 2002 in response to a scandal, which revealed
that the Federal Employment Agency had significantly embellished the numbers of successfully
placed job seekers. The Hartz Commission was composed of 15 experts from industry, politics and
academia, and named after the chairman of the Commission, Peter Hartz, who was an executive in
charge of personnel at Volkswagen at the time. The Commission published its suggestions for labor
market policy changes in August 2002. These suggestions led to the Hartz reform package, which
was implemented from January 1st 2003 onwards. Table 1 gives an overview of the timing and
content of the Hartz I-IV laws, and Appendix A.1 provides more details on the reform contents.
with welfare take-up and Attanasio et al. (2012) evaluate the impact of transfers on the marginal utility of income.
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Broadly summarized, the first wave aimed at raising labor demand, the objective of the second
wave was to improve labor market efficiency, and the final wave was targeted at increasing labor
supply.
Table 1: The Hartz Reforms
Announcement: February 22nd 2002
- The Hartz Commission is appointed to suggest labor market reforms.
Labor demand: Hartz I & II laws, taking effect on January 1st 2003
- Hiring of temporary workers is made easier.
- Continued training is subsidized with vouchers.
- Tax exemption thresholds are increased for mini- and midi-jobs, from April 1st on.
- Subsidies for startups by the unemployed are introduced.
Market efficiency: Hartz III law, taking effect on January 1st 2004
- The Federal Employment Agency is restructured to improve service delivery and job
placement of the unemployed.
Labor supply: Hartz IV law, taking effect on January 1st 2005
- The long-term unemployed receive less support, now in the form of a flat-rate payment.
- Unemployment benefit receipt is made further contingent on asset-based means testing.
- Sanctions are introduced if the unemployed refuse job offers.
The Hartz I and II reforms came into effect on January 1st 2003. Hartz I, the first of the four
‘Laws for Modern Services in the Labor Market’, facilitated temporary employment and introduced
new training subsidies. Hartz II further regulated marginal employment, so-called mini- and midi-
jobs, and sponsored business startups by the unemployed. Mini-jobs provided tax exemption of
worker contributions to social security and lifted the threshold for such marginal tax-exempt em-
ployment from a monthly income of 325 to 400 Euros. Midi-jobs incurred reduced social security
contributions on a sliding scale for earnings up to 800 Euros per month. The definition of marginal
employment was also extended to employees working more than 15 hours per week. As a result
of Hartz II, the number of workers holding a mini-job as their main employment increased from
around 13% in 2003 to 16% in 2006, and additionally over 4% of workers engaged in mini-jobs as a
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second job and more than 3% of workers held midi-jobs by 2006 (Galassi, 2017). The third reform
law, Hartz III, was implemented from January 1st 2004, and restructured the Federal Employment
Agency with the objective of making it a modern, client-oriented service provider. Hartz IV came
into effect on January 1st 2005, and was one of the most extensive and controversial labor market re-
forms that was ever implemented in Germany. It significantly changed the structure and generosity
of unemployment receipts, by combining unemployment assistance for the longer-term unemployed
with social assistance into a flat-rate payment, and introducing sanctions to promote more active
job search. The effects of Hartz IV for payments received by the unemployed were ambiguous. For
example, households with low incomes in employment and single-parent households profited from
the reform, while those with higher employment incomes experienced a reduction of benefits (Koch
and Walwei, 2005). A separate law in January 2005 specified reductions of unemployment benefit
durations, which we do not analyze in this paper. These reductions in benefit duration were applied
to unemployment spells starting from February 2006 on, with the first duration cuts in effect only
in 2007.
2.1 The Reform Effects
To examine the impact of the Hartz reform laws, we use data on around 430,000 males working
in 340,000 firms from the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB) between 2001
and 2005. The data are stratified into three skill groups. Workers with an intermediate school
leaving certificate or less are defined as low-skilled, workers with a vocational qualification such as
an apprenticeship and with an upper secondary school certificate are combined in a medium-skill
group, and university graduates are classified as high-skill workers.
2.1.1 Employment
Figure 1 plots the aggregate unemployment rate of Germany between 2000 and 2007. The dates of
the announcement and implementations of the Hartz reforms are denoted by vertical dashed and
solid lines respectively.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate 2000-2006
Notes: The unemployment rate displayed is for the share unemployed of employees covered
by social insurance, and is provided by the Bundesagentur für Arbeit.
As shown in Figure 1, unemployment increases during the implementation of the reforms be-
tween 2003 and 2005 and falls after the Hartz IV law comes into force in 2005. The increase in
unemployment is already visible from the initial announcement of reforms after the appointment
of the Hartz Commission in February 2002. With the implementation of the fourth Hartz law,
unemployment rose to a historical high with over 5.2 million workers unemployed.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows the outflows from unemployment and panel (b) the inflows into
unemployment. All monthly series have been seasonally adjusted using the X-12-Arima program.2
The series indicate that the increased unemployment over the implementation period is primarily
driven by a fall in the job finding rate, and the post-reform decrease in unemployment is associated
with a higher job finding rate. Separation rates increase slightly for the unskilled over the reform
periods. Unskilled workers have the highest separation rates and these remain higher post-2005
compared to the pre-reform period.
2X-12-Arima is a software package developed by the U.S. Census Bureau for seasonally adjusting time series data.
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Figure 2: Transition rates 2000-2006
(a) Job finding rates (b) Separation rates
Notes: Job finding rates are the monthly shares of unemployed workers who find a job.
Separation rates capture the monthly share of employed workers who exit into unemploy-
ment. The monthly series are for male workers, use SIAB data and are seasonally adjusted.
Workers are defined into skill groups according to their level of education. Workers with
an intermediate school leaving certificate or below are defined as low-skilled, workers with
a vocational qualification such as an apprenticeship and with an upper secondary school
certificate (Abitur) are combined into a medium-skill group, and university graduates are
classified as high-skill.
2.1.2 Wages
The monthly mean and standard deviation of log real daily wages for workers hired from unem-
ployment are reported in Figure 3. Log real daily wages for new hires show a pronounced decline
for all skill groups and a corresponding increase in the standard deviation of wages. Wages are
measured in Euros, and are deflated using the Consumer Price Index published by the German
Federal Statistical Office.
Before announcing the appointment of the Hartz Commission on February 22nd 2002, both series
appear relatively stable. A change in wages coincides with the introduction of the Hartz reforms.
Over the reform periods, mean log wages fall across all three skill strata, with the unskilled and
lowest-paid bearing the bulk of the decrease. Raw wages for low-skilled new hires fall by over 50%
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Figure 3: Log real re-entry wages 2000-2006
(a) Log real re-entry wages (b) Standard deviation of log real re-entry wages
Notes: Log real re-entry wages refer to the log of daily wages in Euros for new hires from
unemployment, and are deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The monthly series are for
male workers, use SIAB data, and are seasonally adjusted. Workers are defined into skill
groups according to their level of education. Workers with an intermediate school leaving
certificate or below are defined as low-skilled, workers with a vocational qualification such
as an apprenticeship and with an upper secondary school certificate (Abitur) are combined
into a medium-skill group, and university graduates are classified as high-skill.
over this period, and the dispersion of wages increases within each skill strata. In our framework,
wages are set endogenously, so that our model can uncover the drivers of this structural change.
2.2 Conceptual Approach
This paper develops a framework for assessing the marked decrease in wages that occurred con-
temporaneously with the Hartz reforms. Due to the comprehensive impact of the Hartz reforms,
standard reduced-form or structural approaches are not suitable for analyzing the effects on wages
and employment. In our model, the structural parameters respond to labor market interventions.
The exact timing of reforms in the model is stochastic, and instead of modeling each reform element
explicitly we treat a reform wave as a shock to the parameter space. In our structural setting we
include important sources of wage dispersion, and account for variability in wages due to observ-
able and unobservable worker differences, firm productivity, a match-specific component, search
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frictions, and sorting across all these dimensions.
A reduced-form evaluation that compares outcomes before and after the implementation of
a specific policy is not feasible in the context of the Hartz reforms. It is likely that firms and
workers anticipated the Hartz policy changes before the implementation of the reform policies and
adjusted their behavior before the first Hartz reform and until Hartz IV took effect. A reduced-form
assessment may also fall short because of the persistence of the endogenous variables, employment
and wages. An alternative approach would impose full structure on the data generating process
and specify each policy explicitly in a structural model. The Hartz reforms, however, lack clear
evaluation metrics and were so wide-ranging that it is not feasible to model all the different reform
features.
Furthermore, we assess the impacts of the Hartz reform waves in isolation. To mitigate the
effects of contemporaneous macroeconomic developments, we restrict our estimation to a relatively
short time period and subtract a trend component from the moments used for identification. As a




Time is continuous and denoted by t, where t ∈ R+. Parameters subscripted by t vary over time,
and θt denotes the vector of parameters at time t. The structural parameters of the model evolve
according to a jump process that occurs at the instance of the introduction of each labor market
reform wave. Changes to θt are fully anticipated by the agents, but in order to keep the problem
stationary, the exact instance at which the policy is implemented is not known. Instead, risk neutral
agents know the instantaneous probability that a policy will be implemented. The Poisson rate ηt
is calibrated to match the frequency of the Hartz reforms. Assuming that agents do not know the
exact implementation dates makes the setting tractable. Instead of an infinite number of states, at
any point in time the Poisson process ensures only five possible states between the announcement
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and implementations of individual policy, as described in Section 2.
The labor market consists of a continuum of infinitely lived workers of mass one, who are
indexed by their level of productivity x ∈ (x, x). Workers can either be employed or unemployed,
and the measure of workers of productivity x is given by `(x). When a worker is unemployed he
receives a flow utility value bt(x). A continuum of firms exist that are indexed by their productivity
y ∈ (y, y). When a worker is hired by a firm, the amount produced depends on the productivities
of the worker and the firm as well as on a match-specific draw, z ∈ (z, z). The match-specific
component z is drawn from a known distribution with density γ(z), which is independent of worker
and firm productivities. The decision whether to form a match is made after the realization of z.
A worker and firm of productivity x and y with a match-specific productivity draw z produce an
amount ft(x, y, z), where ft : (x, x)× (y, y)× (z, z)→ R+. Our initial assumption for the functional
form of ft(x, y, z) is that as z → z, ft(x, y, z)→∞.
The economy is characterized by search frictions and workers cannot observe the full menu of
jobs. Instead job offers arrive randomly to a worker at time t with an exogenous Poisson arrival rate
λ0,t if the worker is unemployed and λ1,t if the worker is employed. The sampling density of firms
is fixed over time and given by υ(y). Jobs are destroyed at an exogenous rate δt, after which the
worker becomes unemployed. Without loss of generality, the sampling densities `(x), υ(y) and γ(z)
are parameterized as uniform on [0, 1], thus x, y and z can be thought of as productivity ranks. It
is isomorphic to think about Hartz policy as directly impacting ft(·) or the primitive distributions
of types.
3.2 Wage Determination
Wage contracts are re-negotiated sequentially as in the sequential auction model, pioneered by
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). For an unemployed worker, wages are determined as in Cahuc
et al. (2006) and Dey and Flinn (2005), where a firm hires a worker from unemployment and the
worker and firm split the surplus. The worker receives a fraction β of the generated surplus and
the firm receives the rest. When a worker is employed, however, wages are determined as in Postel-
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Vinay and Robin (2002), where on-the-job search triggers Bertrand competition between a worker’s
current employer and the poaching firm. If the unemployed worker’s bargaining power β were equal
to zero, then wages are determined as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). We modify the model
setup in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) to ensure that wage offers taken by the unemployed are
well-behaved, which is important for our identification argument. In a standard Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002) wage protocol our model cannot generate sufficiently high starting wages, and wages
offered to an unemployed worker would be decreasing in the productivity type of a firm.
We remain agnostic with respect to the effects of a policy shock on wages, and our setup
can accommodate a variety of protocols with varying degree of wage rigidity. To make as few
assumptions as possible, in the estimation wages are only targeted as an empirical moment in
steady-state, before the announcement of the reform. In Appendix A.2 we outline one of several
potential ways to model the wage re-negotiation process after a policy shock. Since wage re-
negotiation after policy shocks is ambiguous in our setting, we are limited to pre- and post-reform
comparisons of the economy’s steady-states in evaluating the policy impact on wages.
For a given wage w, the surplus is shared between the worker and the firm. Wt(·) denotes the
value function of an employed worker, Ut(·) is the value function of an unemployed worker, Πt(·) is
the value function of a firm that hires a worker, and St(x, y, z) is the total surplus generated by a
match.
Wt(w, x, y, z)− Ut(x) + Πt(w, x, y, z) = St(x, y, z) (1)
It is assumed that the outside option of the firm is zero. The wage provides an unemployed
individual with an additional value equal to βSt(x, y, z). The wage of a worker’s first job after
leaving unemployment is a function of his productivity, the firm’s productivity and the match-
specific draw, and denoted by φ0,t(x, y, z). If a positive surplus is generated then it is in the interest
of the worker and the firm to form a match. Thus the values of y and z that result in matches for
the worker are a function of his own productivity x and given by M0,t(x) ≡ {y, z|St(x, y, z) ≥ 0}.
The wage solves the following equality:
Wt(φ0,t(x, y, z), x, y, z)− Ut(x) = βSt(x, y, z). (2)
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3.3 Wage Mobility
When a firm meets an employed worker, the poaching firm draws a match-specific productivity
that is observable to all parties. The incumbent and the poaching firm then engage in Bertrand
competition to hire or retain the worker. For a worker of productivity x employed in a firm of
productivity y with match-specific productivity z, three possible things can happen.
Move jobs: The worker moves if the surplus generated from the poaching firm is greater than
the current surplus generated. The set of poaching firm and match-specific productivities y′,
z′ is given by M1,t(x, y, z) ≡ {y′, z′|St(x, y′, z′) ≥ St(x, y, z)}. Due to asymmetries in the
wage bargaining process between employed and unemployed workers the determination of the
new wage remains ambiguous. We therefore partition M1,t(x, y, z) into M10,t(x, y, z) and
M11,t(x, y, z), where, M1,t(x, y, z) = {M10,t(x, y, z) ∪M11,t(x, y, z)}.
The more familiar case is when new offers (y′, z′) are in the set M11,t(x, y, z) and the set is
defined as M11,t(x, y, z) ≡ {y′, z′|St(x, y′, z′) ≥ St(x, y, z) ≥ βSt(x, y′, z′)}. In this instance
the worker moves to the new firm and uses his current employment as his outside option in
Bertrand competition. The new wage of the worker is given by equation (3) and he is able to
extract all the surplus from his former match.
Wt(φ1,t(x, y
′, z′, y, z), x, y′, z′)− Ut(x) = St(x, y, z) (3)
If the difference in surplus generated between the poaching firm and the incumbent firm, how-
ever, is sufficiently large, and (y′, z′) ∈M10,t(x, y, z) andM10,t(x, y, z) ≡ {y′, z′|βSt(x, y′, z′) >
St(x, y, z)}, then the worker gets a larger share of the surplus if he uses unemployment as his
outside option. After meeting a higher surplus match, the worker instantaneously quits his
current job and bargains with the poaching firm as an unemployed agent. The worker’s new
wage is defined in equation (2).
Stay in the same job with a wage increase: The worker receives a within-firm promotion
if the surplus generated by a new offer is high enough to trigger Bertrand competition with the
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incumbent firm but not higher than the surplus of the current match. Bertrand competition is
triggered if the surplus of a new match is greater than the worker surplus in the current match.
Formally, the set of y′, z′ is defined as M2,t(w, x, y, z) ≡ {y′, z′|St(x, y, z) > St(x, y′, z′) >
Wt(w, x, y, x)− Ut(x)}. The worker’s new wage solves the equality:
Wt(φ1,t(x, y, z, y
′, z′), x, y, z)− Ut(x) = St(x, y′, z′).
No change: If a worker receives an offer that generates less surplus than he is already taking
from his current match, then the incumbent firm does not need to offer a higher wage to
retain the worker. The set of y′, z′ is defined as (y′, z′) \ {M1,t(x, y, z) ∪M2,t(w, x, y, z)}.
3.4 The Surplus
This class of models has the advantage that only the expression that defines the surplus needs to
be solved. By contrast, solving for the worker and firm individual value functions would involve
five (rather than three) continuous variables. Further, worker and firm value functions would
require specific assumptions about the way in which wages are re-negotiated after a policy shock.
The surplus function is given by equation (4) and is formally derived in Appendix A.3. The +
superscript denotes A+ := max{A, 0}.







′, z′)− St(x, y, z)
]+
υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′ + ηtSt′(x, y, z)
+ (4)
Equation (4) describes the surplus generated by a match and is the fundamental equation of the
model. It dictates the decisions of agents about who to match with and determines the resulting
wages from consummating the match. The surplus consists of the net gain in flow utility, output
minus home production, and three option values. The first integral term is the option premium
in unemployment, the value of future employment to the unemployed. We refer to the second
integral term as the quit premium, which is the additional surplus generated by being able to use
unemployment as a worker’s outside option. Since this expression is non-negative, it increases the
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total number of feasible matches. The final term represents the agent’s expectations about the
time-varying parameters after a shock. If future parameters θt′ generate more (less) surplus than
the current parameters this adds (reduces) value to the current surplus and further encourages
(deters) realizing a match today.
We solve equation (4) numerically. Since the surplus at t depends on the surplus at t′, it
is solved by backward induction.3 Furthermore, one does not need to form expectations about
the value of the future surplus because the policy implications are anticipated. The deterministic
nature of the policy interventions is far simpler to deal with computationally, and it is not obvious
how to calibrate an alternative distribution of beliefs about future policy. Agents’ perfect foresight
over policy therefore seems a reasonable assumption to make. An additional computational burden
arises due to the quit premium. Unlike the option value of unemployment, the set M10,t(x, y, z)
over which we integrate is a function of y and z. Under the majority of parameterizations that we
have experimented with, however, this constitutes a relatively small share of total surplus and it
thus is computationally more efficient not to update this term at every iteration.
Lemma 1 As z → z, St(x, y, z)→∞.
Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix A.4.1.






1{St(x, y, z) ≥ 0}γ(z)dz > 0
}
is equal to the universe of (x, y), that isMxyt : (x, x)× (y, y).
Proposition 1 is proved in Appendix A.4.2. The set of all feasible worker-firm matches at time t
is given by Mxyt . The fact that this set covers the universe of (x, y) suggests that all worker-firm
pairs are feasible. No worker-firm match observed empirically can be used to falsify the model.
Lemma 2 For any x, y, y′ and z′, there is a z such that St(x, y, z) > St(x, y
′, z′).
Lemma 2 is proved in Appendix A.4.3.
3Solving by backward induction relies upon the final state being absorbing. After Hartz IV it is assumed that
agents anticipate no further reforms, and ηt = 0 at a time t that is sufficiently large, as described in Section 3.6.
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Proposition 2 The set
My−1,t (x, y, z) ≡ {y
′, z′|St(x, y′, z′) ≥ St(x, y, z) ∩ y > y′}
is non-empty for all (x, y, z).
Proposition 2 follows directly from Lemma 2. In equilibrium any employed agent may volun-
tarily move to a less productive firm. We use the type of job mobility defined in Proposition 2 as
an identification argument for the variation in the match-specific component z.
3.5 Wage Equations
In order to impose as little structure on the wage setting mechanism as possible, wages are only
defined in stable periods, when ηt = 0. The wage a worker receives depends on whether he has
any outside options in employment. The outside option affects the current wage either because
the worker moved from one employer to another or because he received sufficiently good job offers
while with his current employer. Equation (5) represents the wage of a worker of type x in a firm
of type y and a match-specific draw of z with no outside options. This case arises for all workers
who join a firm from unemployment.
φ0,t(x, y, z) =ft(x, y, z)− (1− β)(r + δt + ηt)St(x, y, z)








′, z′)− βSt(x, y, z)]υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′ (5)
Equation (5) is derived by solving the equality given by equation (2). This derivation and the
formal definitions of the integral supports are provided in Appendix A.5.
A worker of type x in a firm of type y′ with match-specific draw z′ who previously received an
offer from a firm of type y with match-specific draw z receives a wage given by equation (6). This
wage is derived by solving the equality given by equation (3). The derivation and the definition of
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all sets are provided in Appendix A.6.
φ1,t(x, y, z, y









[S(x, y′′, z′′)− S(x, y′, z′)]υ(y′′)γ(z′′)dy′′dz′′ (6)
Proposition 3 The set
Mw−1,t (w, x, y, z) ≡ {y
′, z′|St(x, y′, z′) ≥ St(x, y, z) ∩ φ1,t(x, y′, z′, y, z) < w}
is non-empty for some (t, w, x, y, z).
Bertrand competition between employers for employed workers retains the attractive feature
of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) that some employment transitions are associated with a wage
cut. The worker accepts a wage cut because he is sufficiently compensated by the increase in the
option value of future job offers. The proof for this mechanism is provided in Appendix A.7. Since
Proposition 2 is for all (x, y, z) the set Mw−1,t (w, x, y, z) defined above can be partitioned further,
by conditioning on an increase or decrease in firm productivity. In this way, the model is able to
generate any com bination of increase or decrease in wage or firm productivity.
3.6 Labor Dynamics
Rather than modeling the specifics of each reform package, we implement the Hartz policy waves
as a series of shocks to the structural parameters of the model. The impact of each reform package
on the parameter space is fully anticipated. At time t agents believe policies arrive at a Poisson
arrival rate ηt. This model feature is somewhat unrealistic because agents are likely to know the
exact date of the reform in the immediate lead up to a policy implementation. Since in our setup
agents are risk neutral, however, uncertainty over the exact timing of the policy is not important.
Furthermore, before the formation of the Hartz Commission on February 22nd 2002 and after the
implementation of Hartz IV on January 1st 2005, agents believe the parameter space is stable
indefinitely. In these two stable periods, the probability that the parameter space changes is zero,
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ηt = 0. Therefore, from equation (4) the value of the surplus in a match (x, y, z) at time t is equal
to the value of the surplus in the same match for any t′ > t.
The two stable periods can be solved for independently of the evolution of the structural pa-
rameter set before or after the reforms. There are three periods when agents anticipate further
changes to the parameter set, which we refer to as the unstable periods. These unstable periods
take place after the announcement but before implementation of Hartz I and II, after Hartz I and II
but before Hartz III, and after Hartz III but before Hartz IV. In the unstable periods, the surplus
generated of a match today depends on how the structural parameters evolve in the future. These
structural parameters are solved for sequentially by backward induction.
In the first stable period before the reforms were anticipated the distribution of unobservables
(x, y, z) among matched agents or the distribution of worker type (x) among the unemployed are
unclear. The initial allocation of worker, firm and match types is consequential for the effects of the
reforms. For simplicity we therefore assume that the economy is in steady-state before the reform
is announced in February 2002, which seems reasonable because the last recession in Germany
occurred almost a decade earlier in 1993. The initial allocation of workers and firms is derived in
Appendix A.8.
3.6.1 Labor Adjustment
A series of shocks to the parameter space are realized, corresponding to the initial announcement
of the reforms and the subsequent reform implementations. At the incidence of the ith shock, at t
equal to ti, an instantaneous adjustment in labor assignment takes place. All matches that generate
negative surplus after the new realization of the parameter space are separated. Time t−i denotes
the time immediately before ti. Formally, t
−




(ti + ε). Equation (7) shows






(x, y′, z′)dy′dz′ (7)
The first term represents the unemployed from the previous period and the second term are the
employed agents who no longer generate a positive surplus after the new realization of the parameter
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space in ti. The pre-shock measure of employed individuals in period ti of productivity x in firm
y with match-specific component z is conditional on positive surplus still being generated, and
expressed in the following equation.
eti(x, y, z) = {Sti(x, y, z) ≥ 0}et−i (x, y, z) (8)
After the shock is realized, the labor market continues to adjust. Equation (9) is a differential
equation in t that defines the evolution of the measure of unemployed workers. The first term is
the inflow into unemployment from the exogenous separation of employed workers and the second
term represents the outflow, the flow rate at which the unemployed find work.




This equation can be solved for ut(x) and the solution is given below. Intermediate steps are
presented in Appendix A.9. The contemporaneous steady-state unemployment measure uss,t(x) is
obtained by the analogous solution to equation (15) at time t and uti(x) is the measure of agents






















The dynamics for the measure of workers x in (y, z) match at time t is given by equation (11),
which consists of the inflow from unemployment, the inflow from lower surplus employment, the
outflow to unemployment, and the outflow to higher surplus employment respectively.
ėt(x, y, z) = ut(x)λ0,t{St(x, y, z) ≥ 0}υ(y)γ(z)
+ λ1,tυ(y)γ(z)
∫ ∫
{St(x, y, z) ≥ St(x, y′, z′)}et(x, y′, z′)dy′dz′
− δtet(x, y, z)− λ1,tet(x, y, z)
∫ ∫
{St(x, y′, z′) ≥ St(x, y, z)}υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′ (11)
This equation is more complex due to the term describing inflow from lower surplus employment,
which introduces non-linearities that do not exist in the differential equation for unemployment.
We solve equation (11) numerically.
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3.7 Solution of the Model
The solution to the surplus of a match, the wages of a given match, and the distribution of matches
in the economy define the solution of the model. The surplus of a match defined by equation
(4) establishes the sets of feasible matches and job switches, M0,t(x) and M1,t(x, y, z). From
the surplus equation, the wage paid in a given match can be solved explicitly, which is given by
φ0,t(x, y, z) and φ1,t(x, y, z, y
′, z′) depending on types and outside offers. Finally, the flow equations
from the previous subsection define the distribution of different matches at time t: ut(x), et(x, y, z),
and et(x, y, z, y
′, z′). Further details of how the model is solved computationally are provided in
Appendix A.10.
4 Data and Estimation
This section describes our construction of macroeconomic time series for the German labor market,
and how we parameterize, identify and estimate the model. We provide details about the data
generating process, the likelihood function, and the fit of the parameter estimates in matching the
time series. The model is simulated so it matches the data series from January 2001, over 13 months
before the formation of the Hartz Committee, until the end of 2006, twelve months after the final
wave of reforms. For estimating we split the data into a pre-reform period from January 2001 to
January 2002, an announcement period from February to December 2002, the implementation of
Hartz I and II from January to December 2003, the implementation of Hartz III from January to
December 2004, the implementation of Hartz IV from January to December 2005, and a post-reform
period from January to December 2006.
Instead of just the permanent worker type x, we further distinguish skill by observable worker
skill characteristics. Assuming a segmented labor market we stratify the sample and estimate the
model by skill group, indexed by k. Our data includes information on eight skill levels that we use
to allocate workers into three skill groups. Workers with an intermediate school leaving certificate
or below are defined as low-skilled, workers with a vocational qualification such as an apprenticeship
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and with an upper secondary school certificate (Abitur) are combined into a medium-skill group,
and university graduates are classified as high-skill. For observations with missing skill information,
we impute the skill group by following the IP1 procedure in Fitzenberger et al. (2006), which for a
given worker interpolates skill information when it is missing.
The model presented in the previous section is fully parameterized and we estimate the struc-
tural parameters. Our assumptions about the data generating process make an analytically tractable
likelihood function feasible. Our approach to maximize a likelihood function makes inference signif-
icantly more straightforward than more typical estimations by the method of moments or indirect
inference.
4.1 The Data
To examine the impact of the Hartz reforms we use the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Bi-
ographies (SIAB), a German worker-firm dataset. The SIAB is a 2% random sample drawn from
administrative data and links information on workers from German administrative data with firm
information from the Establishment History Panel. We restrict the estimation sample to male full-
and part-time workers between the age of 20 and 60, who are not in vocational training. This
choice of age group means most individuals in the sample have finished their education and are
working. Individual daily employment spell data are available from administrative data for employ-
ees covered by social security. Around 80% of the German labor force are covered by compulsory
social security contributions, which exclude the self-employed, public sector workers and military
employees. The SIAB also includes workers that are registered as unemployed but does not provide
information on out-of-the-labor-force status. Our paper focuses on men only due to the lack of
data on labor market transitions from non-participation, which disproportionately affect women.
Including women in the estimation sample would likely lead to more pronounced effects of the Hartz
II reform on wages, as women account for a larger share of the take-up of mini- and midi-jobs. Data
access to the SIAB was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre of the German Federal
Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and subsequently by means
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of remote data access.
We use a conservative measure of unemployment, which includes only recipients of benefits
or assistance payments who worked before becoming unemployed but not other job seekers. This
measure of unemployment is consistent over time but is lower than the officially recorded number of
unemployed by construction. It has the advantage of reducing the effect of a spike in unemployment
in January 2005 that is largely due to a change in measuring unemployment as previous recipients
of social assistance were required to register as unemployed (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2005).4
Crucially, this allows us to keep a consistent definition of unemployment across our estimation
window that is unaffected by the reclassification in 2005.
The mean of daily real wages for employed workers in our sample is 74.24 Euros and 49.72 Euros
for newly hired workers who re-enter employment. Unemployed workers receive an average daily
benefit payment of 33.42 Euros. Low-skill workers with an average wage of 53.70 Euros account
for 10% of observations, 76% of workers are medium-skill with an average wage of 70.80 Euros and
14% are high-skill workers earning an average wage of 108.26 Euros. The sizes of the three skill
groups are relatively constant, with some decline in the number of low- and medium-skill workers
and a small increase of high-skill workers. The number of workers and the proportion of top-coded
wages by skill group are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Number of workers and share of top-coded wages by skill group
Number of workers Share top-coded Share re-entry top-coded
Year S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
2001 36,583 267,027 46,201 0.005 0.054 0.384 0.004 0.048 0.328
2002 35,701 263,822 46,729 0.005 0.053 0.387 0.004 0.048 0.329
2003 35,145 264,046 46,977 0.002 0.033 0.299 0.002 0.030 0.257
2004 34,765 262,102 47,182 0.002 0.034 0.304 0.002 0.030 0.263
2005 36,187 262,305 47,599 0.002 0.033 0.303 0.002 0.030 0.263
Notes: S1, S2 and S3 refer to low-skill, medium-skill and high-skill workers respectively.
4The differences between alternative measures and data sources for unemployment in Germany are discussed in
Hertweck and Sigrist (2013) and Rothe and Wälde (2017).
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Wages reported in German social security data are subject to top-coding so that wages above
a threshold are censored at the threshold value, which is defined separately for West and East
Germany for each year. We apply these social security wage thresholds to top-code the simulated
data by the same amounts. This means we can treat the simulated data in the same way as the
real data and do not have to interpolate top-coded values as in Card et al. (2013). Of employed
workers’ wages 8.2% are subject to top-coding. Top-coding is more pertinent for high-skill workers,
of whose wages 33.5% are top-coded. Wages of newly hired workers tend to be lower and only 6.7%
are affected by top-coding.
We construct and match monthly moments by skill group for employment transition rates,
unemployment duration and the mean and standard deviation of income of employed workers and
of re-entrants from unemployment. In the estimation we match four rates of transitions between
employment states. First, the job finding rate is defined as the monthly share of unemployed workers
who find and accept a job. Moving from unemployment to a job is not the only route for workers to
exit from unemployment. Rothe and Wälde (2017) document that during the large reduction of the
unemployment rate following the Hartz reforms, 28% of those exiting unemployment retired and
13% participated in labor market policy programs. Such reductions in unemployment in response
to the Hartz reforms are beyond the scope of our analysis in this paper. Second, the separation
rate captures the monthly share of employed workers who exit into unemployment. We further
match two moments that capture job-to-job transitions.5 While all job switches are efficient in the
sense that the combined surplus is greater at the poaching firm, a move to a less productive firm
can take place as described in Proposition 2. If a worker moves to a less productive firm, they
are sufficiently compensated by a higher match-specific draw. We therefore distinguish between
job-to-job transitions up and down the firm ladder, and match the total rate of job-to-job moves
amongst the employed and the share of moves that are to more productive firms. We rank firms
based on a poaching index as implemented in Bagger and Lentz (2019). Firms are deemed to be of
5Recall from the previous section, that in some instances employed workers use unemployment as a threat point in
the wage bargaining game. This is a threat that never materializes and we therefore only include ordinary job-to-job
transitions without any intermediary unemployment spells.
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higher rank the greater is the proportion of hires from employment relative to unemployment. Firm
rank is defined as the share of new hires that are hired from employment, and is measured only for
firms with a total inflow of more than 15 hires. The poaching index πj is constructed as the number
of employees hired from employment Ej over hires from employment and from unemployment Uj





Unemployment duration is defined as the number of months a worker has spent in unemployment
since his last employment spell, as recorded in the IAB Benefit Recipient History data. Wages are
reported as log real daily wages in Euros, and are deflated using the yearly Consumer Price Index
from the German Federal Statistical Office. In the case of overlapping or multiple spell observations
for an individual, we use the spell with the highest recorded wage.
As the monthly moment series exhibit marked seasonality for the month of January, we sea-
sonally adjust all series to ensure that policy reforms are not mistaken with seasonal variation
present in the data. To adjust for seasonal variation from January 1981 to December 2009, we use
the X-12-Arima program, which is a software developed by the U.S. Census Bureau for seasonally
adjusting time series data. The inclusion of marginally employed workers in the SIAB data from
1999 onward causes a break in the wage series. For the purpose of seasonal adjustment we level
this break out by multiplying the pre-break series with the ratio of the twelve-months post- to
pre-break averages. To avoid negative values for seasonally adjusted transition rates, we take the
log of transition moments, seasonally adjust, take the exponent of the seasonally adjusted series,
and adjust so that the overall means sum to the means of the raw transition rates.
4.2 Parameterization
For the estimation timing is important. Time is measured in months and superscript τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
denotes the period to which the parameter applies. Pre-reform values are denoted by τ = 1, τ = 2
are the parameter values after the first wave comprising the Hartz I and II laws, τ = 3 after Hartz
III has taken effect, and τ = 4 after Hartz IV is implemented. The absence of a τ superscript
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indicates a time-invariant parameter.
We make a number of parametric assumptions. The discount rate r is calibrated to be equivalent
to a 5% annual rate. The productivity levels x, y and z are bounded between 0 and 1, and are
drawn from uniform distributions. Assuming uniformity of type is without loss of generality, and
x, y and z are interpreted as ranks in their respective distributions. All variations in productivity
occur through a production function of the form:












The scale parameter f0,k reflects the level of production for worker skill group k, f1,k, f
τ
2,k and
f τ3,k determine the variability in x, y and z, and Φ
−1(·) denotes the inverse of a standard normal
distribution. Endogenous adjustments of firm and job types in the economy are captured by changes
to f2 and f3 respectively. The relative size of the variation in firm type f2 and match type f3 can
be separately identified through the ratio of job-to-job mobility associated with movements up or
down the firm ladder, as described in Proposition 2. Similarly, simulations of the model suggest
that in order to match the second moments of wages we need to alter the total variability of x, y and
z. As the relative contributions of worker, firm and match effects cannot be identified, we set the
sum of the match and firm type variabilities equal to unity, f τ2,k + f
τ
3,k := 1 for all skill groups k in
time period τ , and estimate f1,k without constraints. Since the match and firm contributions enter
symmetrically into the production function, their relative size describes their relative importance
in output.




k are all assumed to be time-
varying and vary by worker type k. Home production is also allowed to vary with policy, and we
further distinguish between a pecuniary and nonpecuniary component in the spirit of Chodorow-
Reich and Karabarbounis (2016), denoted by p and n, respectively. For simplicity we make both
components independent of worker type x. The nonpecuniary component is assumed to be fixed







The pecuniary component of home production is calibrated prior to the estimation by fitting a
step function to the mean of income for the unemployed6, as shown in Appendix A.11. The aver-
age pecuniary value of home production is affected not just by the generosity of payments during
unemployment but also, amongst other things, by the relative number of long-term unemployed
who receive lower payments than the short-term unemployed both before and after the reforms, as
explained in Appendix A.1. In addition to the generosity of payments received during unemploy-
ment, this calibration of the flow benefit of unemployment thus also partly captures the prospects
of the unemployed.
We estimate a vector of exogenous parameters, which is θk ∈ Θ ∈ R20 for a skill group k and is
defined below. The vector arrows denote that the respective parameters change after every policy









Identification of the model’s parameters motivates our choice of moments. While parameters are
co-dependent to some degree, each parameter is particularly relevant for certain series. Specifically,
the parameters to be estimated are the offer arrival rate for the unemployed λ0, the job arrival
rate for the employed λ1, the exogenous separation rate δ, the level of work production f0, the
variabilities in worker type f1, in firm type f2 and in match type f3, the non-pecuniary aspects of
home production home production bn, and the worker’s bargaining power β.
Employment dynamics are primarily governed by job offer arrival rates and separation rates.
While the breadth of matching sets and endogenous separations also matter, the rate at which
workers find jobs and lose them identify λ0, λ1 and δ. The degree of variation in worker and firm
type f1 and f2 are identified by the mean duration of unemployment of the newly employed and the
proportion of job-to-job transitions moving up the firm ladder. To understand why the duration of
unemployment determines the variation in worker type, consider the case where f1 = 0, all workers
6In order to be consistent with the estimation we take out a linear trend component that is extrapolated from
historic data.
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are homogeneous. In this instance, the distribution of the duration of unemployment would be
exponential, with the inverse scale parameter governed entirely by the rate at which unemployed
workers find jobs. As shown in Section 5.3, unemployment duration serves as a good proxy for
worker type, with less productive workers facing more and longer instances of unemployment.7
The relative importance of firm or match type, the difference between f2 and f3, is determined by
the proportion of job-to-job transitions to more productive firms. As described by Proposition 2,
workers move to worse firms because they are sufficiently compensated by a larger match-specific
component.
The remaining parameters are largely identified by wage moments. The level and dispersion of
both classes of wage moments are driven by the level of home production b and the scale parameter
in the production function f0. For large b a worker’s outside option is high and for a given worker
there is less dispersion in wages. The overall level of wages is intrinsically linked to the overall level
of production and hence f0 helps pin this down. Finally, the difference in the mean wage of newly
employed workers and the economy at large depends on the bargaining position of newly employed
workers. For high β differences are principally driven by job ladder effects, as workers slowly become
better and better matched. Whereas when unemployed workers face worse bargaining conditions
this difference is exasperated.
4.4 The Data Generating Process
The true data for skill group k, X0k , are a T by N matrix of the macroeconomic time series described
in subsection 4.1, where T is the length of the time series and N the number of moments targeted.
We use moments for 60 months from January 2001 until December 2005, and assume that the true
data X0k is the sum of the model prediction X
M (θk), a deterministic trend X
T
k and an irregular







In our setting the trend and cyclical components represent the German economy independent
of the reforms. In expectation the cyclical component is of mean zero and at the introduction of the
7A similar argument for identifying the variation in worker type is made in Bagger and Lentz (2019).
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first wave of reforms, we set the trend equal to zero. Given this normalization the effects of the Hartz
reforms can be uncovered from changes in XM (θk) after subtracting other changes that would have
happened in the absence of the reforms. The model and trend components are deterministic but
the cyclical component is random. The cyclical component XCk allows us to specify an analytical
likelihood function, as for any XM (θk) and X
T
k there exists an X
C
k to rationalize the true data X
0
k .
The trend and cyclical components are fitted from January 1993 until February 2002. This
period corresponds to the first inclusion of a representative East German sample in the data up
to the formation of the Hartz Committee. The trend of each moment is assumed to be linear.
Results for non-linear trends with higher order polynomials are qualitatively similar. We assume
the cyclical component for skill group k to be drawn independently from a multivariate normal
distribution with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Σk.
The likelihood function describes the likelihood of observing the innovative shocks required to
rationalize the observed data. For a Σk the vector of innovative shocks at time t is defined as a
function of the vector of structural parameters θk.
εt,k(θk) = x
0
t,k − xMt (θk)− xTt,k
Since εt,k(θk) is distributed following a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and
variance-covariance matrix Σk, we can write the likelihood function as


















T is the length of the time series, N is the number of series, g(·) is the probability density of a
multivariate normal distribution, and | · | represents the determinant. Instead of maximizing the
likelihood, we minimize its natural log.
To improve the fit of the moments and to increase the functionality of the estimation procedure,
we make two refinements. The likelihood function is highly nonlinear, which is partly due to
spikes in employment dynamics at the instance of policy implementation, and particularly in the
27
endogenous job destruction process. Endogenous job destructions occur at the announcement or
implementation of policy reform. The mass of matches that are no longer feasible depends on the
history of all other variables and can be large, so that they are only rationalized by improbably
large draws of ε. To smooth the likelihood function and to decrease the dimensionality of the
problem we remove the months of implementation from the criterion.8
5 Results
This section presents the parameter estimates and the fit of the targeted dynamics of the model.
We then simulate the model at steady-state before and after the reforms and evaluate the aggregate
impact of the policies and the relative importance of successive policy waves.
5.1 Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates of the model are reported in Table 3, with asymptotic standard errors in
the parentheses below the point estimates. To ensure that the estimates represent global minima
of the log-likelihood function of (14) we initiate our estimation with parallel runs of a Metropolis-
Hastings type algorithm, which is not as susceptible to stopping at local minima as a standard
hill-climbing algorithm. The numbered superscripts correspond to time separated by policy imple-
mentation.9 We first focus on the levels of the estimates, and discuss the evolution of the parameters
in Section 5.3.
The monthly job offer arrival rates are larger than in most previous studies, which is due to the
frequency with which job offers are rejected. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest for every
offer accepted by an unemployed worker between four and ten are rejected on average, depending
on the period and the skill group. The number of rejected jobs increases sharply with skill. While
larger than in much previous work, it is hard to verify whether the proportion of job offers leading to
matches is reasonable, as typically only accepted offers are observed in the data. That said, using
8We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
9Specifically, the numbers denote (1) before the first wave, (2) after the first but before the second wave, (3) after
the second but before the third wave, and (4) after the third and final wave.
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Notes: All parameter estimates are reported to three significant figures. Asymptotic standard errors are presented
in parentheses and reported to four decimal places. The numbered superscripts in parentheses denote (1) before the
first wave, (2) after the first but before the second wave, (3) after the second but before the third wave, and (4) after
the third and final wave.
a unique dataset on job seekers, Faberman et al. (2017) find that approximately one-seventh of
employer contacts with unemployed workers lead to a job.10 This proportion, from a U.S. context,
is broadly in line with our value for Germany. For all three skill groups, an unemployed worker
extracts approximately a quarter of the surplus from the firm. While this value is somewhat smaller
than is often estimated in the literature, this bargaining power is compensated by later negotiations
triggered by outside offers, where the worker may be able to extract more rents from the firm.
The productivity parameters indicate the relative importance of worker, firm and match type in
production. Worker type appears the most important in determining total output, governed by f1.
For medium- and high-skill workers firm type is more consequential than match type and f2 > 0.5.
But for the low-skilled the job-specific component is more important than the firm type.
10This number is derived from moments reported in Faberman et al. (2017), by calculating (mean offers in a month
× proportion of all offers accepted)/mean contacts received in a month = (0.373 × 0.483)/1.261 ≈ 1/7.
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5.2 The Fit
In this section we present the fit of the moments targeted in estimation. The simulated series are
displayed in Figures 4, 5 and 6 for low-, medium- and high-skilled workers respectively. The solid
black line represents the data and the blue line denotes the simulation. The shaded blue area is the
95% confidence interval obtained by repeated redrawing of the series of shocks. Overall, the model
matches the level and dynamics of the targeted moments, with a number of deviations between the
simulations of the estimated moments and the data discussed here.
Firstly, for low- and medium-skilled workers, the moment that captures the proportion of job
switchers moving to a more productive firm does not match the data closely in terms of the level
and dynamics, which is a consequence of imposing the identity f τ2,k + f
τ
3,k := 1 on the model. As
long as the the overall job-to-job transition rate is matched well, the lack of a better fit for this
moment has a negligible effect on our main results. As a consequence, however, results regarding
the impact of the Hartz reforms on the relative importance of firms and jobs for good matches are
not fully reliable. Further, the job finding rate of the unemployed exhibits an upturn at the end
of the sample window in 2005 for all three skill groups that is present in the data and not in our
simulations. We underestimate the job finding rate for this period across each skill group because
the final discontinuity in our model is in January of 2005.
With respect to the wage moments, recall the model only matches these moments pre-reform, in
order not to impose how wages are re-negotiated after policy changes. The model does not jointly
match the wage distribution of the newly employed and the distribution of wages overall, and the
model over-predicts the ratio of the overall mean wage in the economy relative to the mean wage of
the newly employed across the three skill groups.11 Although the levels are not matched precisely,
the trend across each skill group is well-fitted, and the wage effects of the reforms can therefore be
credibly inferred from our model.
11Due to the trade-off between the mean of wages and their standard deviations, we cannot simply reconcile the
relative mean wage predictions by decreasing worker bargaining power β. If we reduce β the measured dispersion in
overall wages increases, which is a moment that is already over-estimated. A lower β drives up the variance of log
wages by increasing the mass at the left tail of the distribution, as the lowest earners tend to those hired straight from
unemployment. This effect has a larger impact on the left rather than the right tail as it is not subject to censoring.
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Figure 4: Simulated series for the low skilled
Mean unemployment duration Monthly unemployment-job Monthly job-unemployment
(months) of re-entrants transition rate transition rate
Monthly job-job Proportion of job-job transitions Mean daily (log) wage (Euros)
transition rate made up the firm ladder of all employed
Stand. dev. of daily (log) Mean daily (log) wage (Euros) Stand. dev. of daily (log)
wage (Euros) of all employed of re-entrants wage (Euros) of re-entrants
Notes: The solid black line represents the data and the blue dashed line the simulations. 95% confidence
intervals are represented by the shaded area and obtained by repeated re-simulations. Unemployment
duration refers to months of unemployment for workers who exit unemployment. The unemployment-job
rates are the monthly shares of unemployed workers who find and accept a job. Job-unemployment rates
capture the monthly share of employed workers who exit into unemployment. Log wages refer to the log
of daily wages in Euros, and are deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The monthly series are for male
workers, use SIAB data and are seasonally adjusted.
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Figure 5: Simulated series for the medium skilled
Mean unemployment duration Monthly unemployment-job Monthly job-unemployment
(months) of re-entrants transition rate transition rate
Monthly job-job Proportion of job-job transitions Mean daily (log) wage (Euros)
transition rate made up the firm ladder of all employed
Stand. dev. of daily (log) Mean daily (log) wage (Euros) Stand. dev. of daily (log)
wage (Euros) of all employed of re-entrants wage (Euros) of re-entrants
Notes: The solid black line represents the data and the blue dashed line the simulations. 95% confidence
intervals are represented by the shaded area and obtained by repeated re-simulations. Unemployment
duration refers to months of unemployment for workers who exit unemployment. The unemployment-job
rates are the monthly shares of unemployed workers who find and accept a job. Job-unemployment rates
capture the monthly share of employed workers who exit into unemployment. Log wages refer to the log
of daily wages in Euros, and are deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The monthly series are for male
workers, use SIAB data and are seasonally adjusted.
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Figure 6: Simulated series for the high skilled
Mean unemployment duration Monthly unemployment-job Monthly job-unemployment
(months) of re-entrants transition rate transition rate
Monthly job-job Proportion of job-job transitions Mean daily (log) wage (Euros)
transition rate made up the firm ladder of all employed
Stand. dev. of daily (log) Mean daily (log) wage (Euros) Stand. dev. of daily (log)
wage (Euros) of all employed of re-entrants wage (Euros) of re-entrants
Notes: The solid black line represents the data and the blue dashed line the simulations. 95% confidence
intervals are represented by the shaded area and obtained by repeated re-simulations. Unemployment
duration refers to months of unemployment for workers who exit unemployment. The unemployment-job
rates are the monthly shares of unemployed workers who find and accept a job. Job-unemployment rates
capture the monthly share of employed workers who exit into unemployment. Log wages refer to the log
of daily wages in Euros, and are deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The monthly series are for male
workers, use SIAB data and are seasonally adjusted.
33
While in the estimation we target only the mean and the standard deviation of wages, in
Appendix A.12 we present kernel plots of simulated and real wage data for each skill group. Since
the targeted moments are subject to top-coding we also present the distribution of wages our model
predicts absent of censoring.
5.3 Simulations
The persistence of employment and wages makes inference about the long-run impact of the Hartz
reforms difficult. Using our structural framework we can determine the long-run effect on employ-
ment by computing the steady-state wage distribution, evaluated at the parameter estimates pre-
and post-reform.
5.3.1 Aggregate Outcomes
To investigate the long-run impact of the three reform waves jointly, we compare employment and
wages in two steady-states, one for the initial values of the structural parameters and the other one
for the structural parameter values after the final reform wave implementation. Table 4 presents
the impact directly attributable to the Hartz reforms before and after the policies are implemented.
The final column is weighted according to the relative sizes of the three skill groups given in Table
2.
Table 4: Combined impact of the Hartz reforms
Low skill Medium skill High skill Aggregate
Employment rate -0.95 +0.05 -0.68 -0.16
percentage point change
Wage -10.69 -3.66 -2.90 -4.12
percentage change
Our key finding is that the Hartz reforms decreased employment by 0.16 percentage points, and
this negligible fall in employment came with a fall in wages of 4.12%. By contrast, the objective of
policymakers was to achieve a significant decrease in unemployment. Inspection of the first three
columns in Table 4 highlights the distributional impact of the policy, with the low skilled bearing
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the brunt of the wage costs. Mean wages for workers without formal qualifications fell by 10.69%.
This group also suffered the largest declines in employment, with the employment rate dropping
by two-thirds of a percentage point. While all groups suffered as a consequence of the reforms, the
low skilled were hit hardest. The slight fall in low-skilled employment seems to contradict the rise
in the job finding rate exhibited in Figure 4, but the increase in the job finding rate is a comparison
of two steady-states while the fall in low-skilled employment in Figure 4 displays off steady-state
dynamics. In this setting the job finding rate is likely to be higher out of steady-state as the labor
market is still adjusting.
Since our analysis compares two steady-states, changes in employment are governed by changes
in the rate at which workers find and lose jobs. For all but the highest-skilled workers, the Hartz
reforms led to a rise in both job finding and separation rates, so that the ex-ante employment effect
is ambiguous. It turns out that aggregated, these two effects almost perfectly offset one another in
determining the overall impact on employment. Despite minimal changes to the overall employment
rate, the experience of a typical unemployed worker is likely to change considerably as a consequence
of the reforms. Workers receive less remuneration while in unemployment, but can on average expect
a shorter duration of their spell. Previously, the low, medium and high skilled on average expected
an unemployment duration of 12.0, 9.6 and 13.6 months, respectively. In the aftermath of the
reforms, however, expected unemployment duration shortened to 10.3 months for the low skilled
and to 9.4 months for the medium skilled. Only the highest-skilled workers experience a rise in
expected unemployment duration, with an increase to 14.8 months. Even though our overall results
show little aggregate employment impact, these changes in unemployment duration highlight that
the reforms were consequential for changing the flexibility of the labor market.
5.3.2 Individual Hartz Reforms
We further investigate the impact of each reform separately, as well as of pairs of reform waves.
The effects of the first wave and the first and second waves jointly can be uncovered without any
further parametric assumptions. Since we estimate the vector of structural parameters pre- and
post-reform in both instances, it is straightforward to simulate the steady-state economy imposing
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these changes. Assessing the other waves in isolation requires parameterizing the evolution of the
structural parameters. We assume that policies affect the structural parameters in a proportional
way, where π is a vector capturing the proportional impact of a specific wave or of a pair of waves.
Under this assumption we can construct a vector of structural parameters as if a later reform wave
was implemented in the initial economy, and θpost-reform = π◦θpre-reform. For example, to understand
the impact of the second wave in isolation of the other reforms, the increase in the separation rate
of the low skilled by approximately 2%, as shown in Table 3, is applied to the pre-reform level, so
that the separation rate used for simulating the model is equal to 0.0082× 1.02 ≈ 0.0084.
Table 5: Combined impact of the reforms on employment and wages
Employment rate percentage point change
Hartz I/II Hartz III Hartz IV
Hartz I/II 0.47 ↓ - -
Hartz III 0.45 ↓ 0.07 ↓ -
Hartz IV 0.02 ↓ 0.11 ↓ 0.04 ↓
Combined impact: 0.16 ↓
Wage percentage change
Hartz I/II Hartz III Hartz IV
Hartz I/II 0.48 ↓ - -
Hartz III 0.14 ↓ 0.63 ↑ -
Hartz IV 4.66 ↓ 1.81 ↓ 2.65 ↓
Combined impact: 4.12 ↓
Table 5 shows the aggregate effects of individual reforms on employment and wages. The
diagonal elements depict a reform wave in isolation, and the off-diagonal elements represent the
implementation of pairs of reforms. Policies aimed at labor demand and supply appear to have neg-
ative impacts on employment and on wages, while the effect of the Hartz III reform that increased
matching efficiency was more positive.
The first wave aimed at stimulating labor demand by subsidizing low-hours work, in order to
increase employment. Although the impacts are relatively small, we find that the policy did not have
its intended effects. The fall in employment is due to small changes in the arrival rate of job offers
coupled with a decrease in job security. Our interpretation of this result is that firms substituted
away from permanent employment contracts to shorter-term and shorter-hour contracts, rather
than posting more jobs.
The policy objective of the second wave was to improve the efficiency of matching in the labor
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market. We find no discernible impact of the Hartz III reform on employment, with the arrival rate
of job offers falling for the low and high skilled and rising for the medium skilled. The policy lifts
the flow value associated with unemployment, which could potentially happen if the job seeking
assistance provided freed up time for the unemployed. This rise in b lifts wages for two reasons: the
unemployed are able to choose only better suited matches, and the outside option of the unemployed
in wage bargaining with a given firm increases.
The final wave has the most pronounced effects on wages. These effects are driven by a reduction
in the flow value of unemployment that is due to the reduction in the generosity of unemployment
benefit. In isolation, the reduction in unemployment benefit would generate larger wage effects
than the 2.6% reduction that our model predicts. However, following the reform there is also an
increase in the rate at which employed workers received job offers. This phenomenon occurs for all
three skill groups. Consequently, the fall in wages are partially offset because of steeper job ladder
effects. The employment effects on the other hand are negligible. Although the response in labor
demand is strong, it has almost no effect on the level of employment, as the beneficiaries of this
response are employed, rather than unemployed workers. Inspection of Table 3 shows that while
λ1 grew considerably for all groups, and λ0 by contrast fell or grew by small amounts.
6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the effects of the comprehensive Hartz reforms on the German labor mar-
ket. We construct and estimate a model of the labor market with forward-looking agents, search
frictions and heterogeneity of workers by education level. These labor market features are critical
for understanding the impact of labor market policy changes in many contexts, where detailed
worker-firm data are available.
In our setting, the Hartz labor market reform laws are treated as shocks to the structural
parameters, which are fully anticipated by forward-looking agents. To assess the effects of the
German Hartz reforms the model is estimated by maximum likelihood estimation with matched
worker-firm data. Identification exploits the off steady-state dynamics of the model. The results of
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our evaluation show that the Hartz reforms had a negligible impact on employment and at the same
time reduced wages. The primary driver of this reduction in wages is the final wave of reforms,
which reduced the generosity of unemployment benefits in particular for the long-term unemployed.
Our paper shows that a comprehensive approach to evaluating labor market policy changes
provides insights that are not easily obtained in reduced-form assessments of particular reform
aspects, or with calibrated macro models. The evaluation approach we propose makes use of
detailed administrative data on workers and firms, which have recently become available for an
increasing number of countries. In this framework, detailed data enable a careful assessment of the
impacts of complex and multifaceted policy.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Hartz Reforms
The Hartz I and II laws came into effect on January 1st 2003. Hartz I facilitated temporary
employment, and introduced new training subsidies. The reform simplified and extended case-based
exemptions from relatively restrictive employment regulations (Jacobi and Kluve, 2007). Vouchers
for career development training of the unemployed were introduced by the Federal Employment
Agency to support measures with a maximum duration of three months. The reform also created
personnel service agencies, which serve as temporary work agencies to complement the existing local
employment agencies in finding job placements for unemployed workers. Hartz II provided further
regulation of marginal employment by increasing tax threshold for so-called mini- and midi-jobs, and
sponsored business startups by the unemployed. Mini-jobs allow exemption of worker contributions
to income tax and social security and lifted the threshold for such marginal tax-exempt employment
from a monthly income of 325 to 400 Euros. Midi-jobs incur reduced social security contributions
on a sliding scale for earnings up to 800 Euros per month. The definition of marginal employment
was also extended to employees working more than 15 hours per week. Hartz II further introduced
startup subsidies for the unemployed under the name Ich-AG (i.e. Me-Company), which resulted
in 270,000 such startups receiving subsidies from the Federal Employment Agency until the end of
2004. Further details about the reform elements and the number of workers affected are provided
in Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst (2006).
The third reform law, Hartz III, was implemented from January 1st 2004 on, and restructured
the Federal Employment Agency. The placement and job search support of the employment ad-
ministration and the management of its 90,000 employees was reorganized, so that the employment
agency would become a modern client-oriented service provider. Weise (2011) discusses the reor-
ganization of the Federal Employment Agency in greater detail.
Hartz IV came into effect on January 1st 2005 and significantly changed the structure and gen-
erosity of payments received during unemployment, with an aim to increase incentives to work.
Hartz IV combined parts of unemployment assistance with social assistance payments for the long-
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term unemployed, and introduced sanctions to promote more active job search. In practice, the
effect of the change on the generosity of long-term unemployment payments is determined by worker
circumstances with post-reform receipts depending, for example, on the income of the partner and
the number of children. Additional allowances may be available for accommodation and heating.
Before Hartz IV, three types of payments existed for unemployed workers: unemployment insur-
ance payments (Arbeitslosengeld) for the short-term unemployed, and means-tested unemployment
assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) and social assistance for the long-term unemployed. The Hartz IV
reform did not change short-term benefits, which imply that eligible workers receive 60% of their
previous net wage in the case of unemployment, with a maximum duration of 32 months, depend-
ing on age and months worked previous to the unemployment spell. For short-term unemployed
workers with dependent children the replacement rate is 67%. After exhausting short-term benefits,
workers were eligible to time-unlimited unemployment assistance payments at a replacement rate
of 53% of previous net wages, and of 57% if they had dependent children. Hartz IV combined un-
employment assistance and social assistance for the long-term unemployed into a flat-rate payment
that is not indexed to previous wages, and that is now administered by the Federal Employment
Agency. This change decreased payments to many who previously received long-term unemploy-
ment assistance. Price (2018) provides a detailed overview of the eligibility rules and changes for
income replacement and support during unemployment. If acceptable job offers were declined, un-
employed workers could incur sanctions in the form of reduced benefits. Benefit payments became
more contingent on means testing, and the definition of acceptable job offers was widened. After
Hartz IV, unemployed workers were also required to take low-paid jobs including mini-jobs and
jobs that did not correspond to the level of a worker’s training or his previous job. In addition to
the Hartz IV law, reductions to unemployment benefit durations were announced in January 2005.
These changes applied to unemployment spells starting from February 2006 onward, so that the
first duration cuts took effect in 2007.
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A.2 Wage Re-Negotiation: After a Policy Shock
Perhaps the simplest way to model wage re-negotiation would be to assume wages are fully flexible
and can be re-negotiated after the state of the world changes through policy shocks. In this hy-
pothetical scenario wages are re-negotiated assuming the worker has the same firm-match outside
option (y′, z′). The worker can only use this outside option as a bargaining tool with his cur-
rent employer, and we do not consider the possibility of changing employers. This re-negotiation
mechanism ensures tractability. After a shock a match either dissolves and the worker returns to
unemployment or wages are re-negotiated.
The match separates: The match dissolves if the participation (positive surplus) con-
straint no longer holds. The set of time-varying parameters θt′ immediately after a shock, for
which a (y, z) match with a worker of productivity x is endogenously destroyed, is given by
N0,t′(x, y, z) ≡ {θt′ |St′(x, y, z) < 0}.
If a worker’s outside option is unemployment, the outcome of the wage re-negotiation is trivial.
Before the shock a worker of type x in a match (y, z) earned a wage φ0,t(x, y, z). After a shock, as
long as the match is not separated, θt′ /∈ N0,t′(x, y, z), the worker’s new wage is given by φ0,t′(x, y, z).
These wages are determined as the solution to the equality given by equation (2).
If the same worker in the same match with an outside offer (y′, z′) and currently earning w :=
φ1,t(x, y, z, y
′, z′), however, is hit by a shock, his new wage is re-negotiated in one of three ways.
In each case we denote the new wage as w′, which can be a function of a worker’s type (x), his job
type (y, z) and his best outside option (y′, z′).
Use the same outside offer: The worker’s new wage is re-negotiated using the same
firm-match threat point if θt′ is such that
N1,t′(x, y, z, y′, z′) ≡ {θt′ |St′(x, y, z) ≥ St′(x, y′, z′) ≥ βt′St′(x, y, z) ≥ 0}.
In this scenario the match remains incentive compatible. The worker uses the same threat
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point when bargaining with his incumbent firm, and the new wage is given by
w′ = φ1,t′(x, y, z, y
′, z′).
Use unemployment as outside offer:
N2,t′(x, y, z, y′, z′) ≡ {θt′ |βSt′(x, y, z) > St′(x, y′, z′) ≥ 0}
Given the above, a worker gains a greater share of the surplus using unemployment as a
threat point as opposed to his previous best outside option. In the re-negotiation procedure
he bargains with unemployment as his outside option and his new wage is given by
w′ = φ0,t′(x, y, z).
The worker takes all the surplus:
N3,t′(x, y, z, y′, z′) ≡ {θt′ |St′(x, y′, z′) > St′(x, y, z) ≥ 0}
Finally, it could be that after realization of the new parameter set the outside option of the
worker generates a larger surplus than continued employment with his current firm. In our
setting, a worker cannot move to previous job offers, as in such a case a change in policy
would increase job mobility by construction. In this case we assume the worker has all the
bargaining power and is able to extract the entire surplus. His new wage is given by
w′ = φ1,t′(x, y, z, y, z).
A.3 Value Functions
The present discounted value of an unemployed worker of productivity x is equal to bt(x), the flow






′, z′), x, y′, z′)− Ut(x)]υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′
+ηt[Ut′(x)− Ut(x)]
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Using the identity given by equation (2), the above simplifies to:




′, z′)υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′ + ηt[Ut′(x)− Ut(x)]
The value function for an employed worker of productivity x in a firm of productivity y with a
match-specific draw z earning a wage w at time t, is more cumbersome:














[Wt(φ1,t(x, y, z, y
′, z′), x, y, z)−Wt(w, x, y, z)]υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′
+ ηt
[
1{St′(x, y, z) < 0}Ut′(x) + 1{St′(x, y, z) ≥ 0}Wt′(wr, x, y, z)−Wt(w, x, y, z)
]
The four option values in the above expression are unemployment risk, finding a much better job
and using unemployment as a threat point, finding a better job and using the current employer
as a threat point, and promotion within one’s current employer. Unemployment occurs if a match
is exogenously dissolved, which happens at the Poisson rate δt. After a worker meets a new firm,
depending on the draw of y′ and z′, the worker may move if the pair falls in the setM1,t(x, y, z). If
the new job is sufficiently better than the current one (y′, z′) ∈ M10,t(x, y, z) then unemployment
is used as a threat point. If the draw is a small improvement, and (y′, z′) ∈M11,t(x, y, z), then the
worker uses his current employer as a threat point in Bertand competition. Finally, a worker gets a
within-firm promotion if his new offer (y′, z′) ∈M2,t(w, x, y, z). All these sets are formally defined
in Section 3.3.
In addition to the option value of employment there is a possibility that labor market reforms
change the employment value. These reforms occur at a Poisson rate ηt and their implications
depend on the way in which matched agents re-negotiate their employment contract. As discussed
in the body of the paper we wish to remain agnostic and simply say the re-negotiated wage is wr.
In the interest of brevity we label this wage as simple wr but this could be written as a function of
any of the variables in the model. Finally, although we don’t specify the exact wage re-negotiation
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mechanism we do stipulate that if a worker-firm partnership now generates negative surplus we
assume they separate by mutual consent.
If one subtracts the value of unemployment from the value of employment as defined previously
and applies the identity given by equation (3), then the surplus generated for a worker earning a
wage w of productivity x in a firm of productivity y with match-specific productivity z at time t is
derived as the following expression. The worker surplus is defined as the value of employment net
of the worker’s outside option, unemployment.




















+ ηt1{St′(x, y, z) ≥ 0} [Wt′(wr, x, y, z)− Ut′(x)]
Turning to the firm, the value for a firm of productivity y, hiring a worker of productivity x at a
wage rate w with a match-specific productivity of z at time t is given by the function Πt(w, x, y, z).








[Πt(φ1,t(x, y, z, y
′, z′), x, y, z)−Πt(w, x, y, z)]υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′
+ ηt1{St′(x, y, z) < 0}[0−Πt(w, x, y, z)] + ηt1{St′(x, y, z) ≥ 0}[Πt′(wr, x, y, z)−Πt(w, x, y, z)]
The value function for the firm is analogous to that of the worker with a few exceptions. The
flow value of the match is the total output produced ft(x, y, z) net of the wage paid w, the outside
option of the firm is zero and not unemployment, and the firm does not care about the terms of
the worker’s next job, just if the worker leaves. Summing the above two expressions and applying
the identity in equation (1) yields the total surplus generated by a match of a worker with ability
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x and a firm of productivity y with a match-specific productivity of z at time t.










′, z′)− St(x, y, z)
]
υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′
+ ηt1{St′(x, y, z) ≥ 0} [Wt′(wr, x, y, z)− Ut′(x) + Πt′(wr, x, y, z)]
Transferable utility means the final term is the surplus in period t′. Inspection of the sets
M0,t(x) and M10,t(x), reveals the surplus equation can be expressed in a simpler way. Following
the notation of Lise and Robin (2017) we denote A+ := max{A, 0}. The surplus is independent of
the wage rate, which validates the assumption of transferable utility.







′, z′)− St(x, y, z)
]+
υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′ + ηtSt′(x, y, z)
+
A.4 Proofs of Lemma 1, Proposition 1 and Lemma 2
A.4.1 Lemma 1
Given the regularity condition imposed on f that limz→z ft(x, y, z) = ∞, and taking the limit of
the right hand side of equation (4) implies:12
lim
z→z
((r + δt + ηt)St(x, y, z)) =∞+ Ct(x) +Dt(x, y) + Et(x, y)






















Ct(x) is a constant for given x, and thus the limit properties of St(x, y, z) are independent of
this term. Further, it is assumed that St : (x, x)× (y, y)× (z, z)→ R.
12The term Et(x, y) is indexed by t, as by definition t
′ is the period that arrives immediately after t.
49
(i) Assume limz→z St(x, y, z) is equal to a finite number. Then Dt(x, y) would equal a finite
number. Et(x, y) = ∞ for limz→z St′(x, y, z) = ∞ and Et(x, y) is equal to a finite num-
ber in all other situations. Thus, irrespective of the feasible value that Et(x, y) takes,
limz→z St(x, y, z) =∞, which is inconsistent with our assumption.
(ii) Assume limz→z St(x, y, z) = −∞. Then Dt(x, y) =∞ and Et(x, y) =∞ for
limz→z St′(x, y, z) =∞ and Et(x, y) is equal to a finite number in all other situations. Again,
limz→z St(x, y, z) =∞, which is inconsistent with our assumption.
(iii) Finally, assume limz→z St(x, y, z) =∞. ThenDt(x, y) would equal a finite number. Et(x, y) =
∞ for limz→z St′(x, y, z) =∞ and Et(x, y) is equal to a finite number in all other situations.
Thus, irrespective of the feasible value that Et(x, y) takes, limz→z St(x, y, z) = ∞, which is
consistent with our assumption. Q.E.D.
A.4.2 Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, it is enough to show that for any (x, y) there is a z such that St(x, y, z) ≥ 0.
For fixed x and y, the fact that St(x, y, z) is positive translates to the condition that:















′, z′)− St(x, y, z), 0
}]
and N2(z) = ηtSt′(x, y, z)
As z → z, ft(x, y, z) → ∞ and from Lemma 1: as z → z, St(x, y, z) → ∞ which means
N1(z) → 0 and N2(z) → ∞. Thus collectively, the left hand side of the above expression tends to
infinity as z tends to its limit and the right hand side is, for fixed x, constant. Therefore there is a
z which satisfies ft(x, y, z) +N1(z) +N2(z) > N0. This z satisfies St(x, y, z) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
A.4.3 Lemma 2
For fixed x, y, y′, z′, the condition St(x, y, z) > St(x, y
′, z′) can be translated into:
ft(x, y, z) +N1(z) +N2(z) > (r + δt + ηt)St(x, y
′, z′) +N0
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where N0, N1(z) and N2(z) are defined as before.
Only the left-hand side varies with z. From Lemma 1, as z tends to z, the left-hand side tends to
infinity. Therefore there is a z which satisfies ft(x, y, z)+N1(z)+N2(z) > (r+δt+ηt)St(x, y, z)+N0.
This z satisfies St(x, y, z) > St(x, y
′, z′). Q.E.D.
A.5 New Entrant’s Wages
The wage a worker receives at time t, when hired from unemployment, is such that he takes a share
β of the total surplus generated from the match. Recall wages are only defined when ηt = 0.
(r + δt) (Wt (φ0,t (x, y, z) , y, z)− Ut(x)) = (r + δt)βSt(x, y, z)
Computing the option value of employment, derived in Section A.3, evaluated at w = φ0,t (x, y, z)
gives:
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By applying the wage identities defined by equations (2) and (3), we get:






′, z′)− St(x, y, z)
]
υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′















Substituting out the common terms in the above expression and in equation (4), which defines the
surplus, and rearranging yields:
φ0,t(x, y, z) =ft(x, y, z)− (1− β)(r + δt)St(x, y, z)












′, z′)− βSt(x, y, z)]υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′
In this instance, the set M2,t(x, y, z) is simple to define:
M2,t(φ0,t(x, y, z), x, y, z) ≡{y′, z′|S(x, y, z) > St(x, y′, z′) > Wt(φ0,t(x, y, z), x, y, x)− Ut(x)}
M2,t(x, y, z) ≡{y′, z′|St(x, y, z) > St(x, y′, z′) > βSt(x, y, z)}
Our wage equation simplifies further to:
φ0,t(x, y, z) =ft(x, y, z)− (1− β)(r + δt + ηt)St(x, y, z)








′, z′)− βSt(x, y, z)]υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′
A.6 Wages with Outside Options
We substitute φ1,t (x, y, z, y
′, z′) into the option value of employment presented earlier. To review,
φ1,t (x, y, z, y
′, z′) represents the wage a worker of type x in stable period t (ηt = 0) working for a
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[Wt(φ1,t(x, y, z, y
















































Substituting in the value of St (x, y
′, z′) from equation (4) gives:
φ1,t(x, y, z, y









[S(x, y′′, z′′)− S(x, y′, z′)]υ(y′′)γ(z′′)dy′′dz′′
As only a worker’s last job is important, the set M2(·) can be defined without the wage:
M2,t(φ1(x, y, z, y′, z′), x, y, z) ≡{y′′, z′′|S(x, y, z) > S(x, y′′, z′′) > W (φ1(x, y, z, y′, z′), y, z)− U(x)}
M2,t(x, y′, z′) ={y′′, z′′|S(x, y, z) > S(x, y′′, z′′) > S(x, y′, z′)}
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φ1,t(x, y, z, y









[S(x, y′′, z′′)− S(x, y′, z′)]υ(y′′)γ(z′′)dy′′dz′′
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
To verify that the set Mw−1,t (w, x, y, z), as defined in the main body of the text, is non-empty for
some (t, w, x, y, z), we provide an example. Assume t is such that µt = 0, which in the context
of our application is either at the pre-announcement of the policy or after full implementation.
Further, assume w = φ1,t(x, y, z, y, z). This wage rate could arise because of a re-negotiation after
the implementation of a policy or because of competing job offers of identical value. Inspection
of equation (6) coupled with the matching set M2,t(x, y, z) defined above reveals that under these
assumptions a worker receives a wage equal to his marginal product, w = ft(x, y, z).
Then for any firm and match draw (y′, z′) such that the offer is strictly preferred, St(x, y
′, z′) >
St(x, y, z), the new wage offer is:
φ1,t(x,y









[S(x, y′′, z′′)− S(x, y, z)]υ(y′′)γ(z′′)dy′′dz′′ < w
Q.E.D.
A.8 Initial Steady-State
For ease of exposition we consider a steady-state here, which implies that the measures of un-
employed and employed workers of every productivity combination are stable. For unemployed
workers, the flow out of unemployment of workers of any productivity x is equal to the inflow,
which is expressed in the equation below. The measure of unemployed agents of productivity x
is denoted by u(x) and e(x, y, z) is the measure of employed agents of productivity x in a firm of
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The total measure of workers of productivity x in the economy at large is `(x), so that the
right-hand side of equation simplifies to δ [`(x)− u(x)]. Rearranging, the measure of unemployed








Similarly, the flow out of the measure e(x, y, z) is equalized with the inflow, as captured in
equation (16). We express this equation in terms of surplus conditions rather than feasible matching
sets.
u(x)λ0{S(x,y, z) ≥ 0}υ(y)γ(z) + λ1υ(y)γ(z)
∫ ∫
{S(x, y, z) ≥ S(x, y′, z′)}e(x, y′, z′)dy′dz′
=δe(x, y, z) + λ1e(x, y, z)
∫ ∫
{S(x, y′, z′) ≥ S(x, y, z)}υ(y′)γ(z′)dy′dz′ (16)
We implement an iterative solution algorithm for solving this integral equation.
The pool of employed agents are divided into two types. The first type are the employed who
have not received credible outside offers, and whose threat point in wage bargaining is therefore
unemployment. A second type are the employed who have received credible offers while in em-
ployment and have therefore managed to re-negotiate their wage using employment in another firm
as leverage in the bargaining process. The measure of the first employment type only varies with
x, y and z, the productivity triple of the current match. The second measure, however, varies with
x, y and z and similarly with y′ and z′, the second best offer the worker has received since he
left unemployment. We also impose stability on these two measures and call them e0(x, y, z) and
e1(x, y, z, y
′, z′), respectively.
Firstly, we equalize the flow in and out of e0(x, y, z) for all x, y and z. Workers exit to unemploy-
ment u(x) if they exogenously lose their job, with probability δ. They can also exit to employment
with a higher outside option. Exit is either to a different firm, using the current employer as lever-
age (if y′, z′ ∈ M1(x, y, z) ) or they stay with the same employer, using the firm attempting to
55








= λ0u(x)υ(y)γ(z)1{y, z ∈M0(x)}
This expression can be computed directly, by defining the set y′, z′ ∈ {M1(x, y, z) ∪M2(φ0(x, y, z), x, y, z)},
and using the fact that β ∈ (0, 1) as well as the identity given by equation (2).
{M1(x, y, z) ∪M2(φ0(x, y, z), x, y, z)} = {y′, z′|S(x, y′, z′) > S(x, y, z)
∪ S(x, y, z) > S(x, y′, z′) > βS(x, y, z)}
= {y′, z′|S(x, y′, z′) > βS(x, y, z)}
Thus, the steady-state measure e0(x, y, z) can be directly computed. To solve for e1(x, y, z, y
′, z′)
one needs to implement an iterative solution. The steady-state condition defining e1(x, y, z, y
′, z′),
for which indicator functions are used rather than matching sets, is given by:





1{S(x, y′′, z′′) > S(x, y′, z′)}υ(y′′)γ(z′′)dy′′dz′′
]
= λ1υ(y)γ(z)1{S(x, y, z) > S(x, y′, z′)}e(x, y′, z′)
+ λ1e0(x, y, z)υ(y




1{S(x, y, z) > S(x, y′, z′) > S(x, y′′, z′′)}e(x, y, z, y′′, z′′)dy′′dz′′
A.9 Solving the ODE Defining Labor Market Dynamics


































Integrating both sides with respect to t yields the particular solution given below, where C(x) is


















Substituting in the initial condition when t = ti and unemployment is equal to uti which is known
and given by equation (7), the constant of integration can be solved, where uss,t is the contempo-
raneous steady-state unemployment rate and the solution to equation (15).
C(x) = uti(x)− uss,t(x)























We discretize the continuum of types of worker, firm, match and outside options on a Chebyshev














, j = 0, ..., X − 1
All five types (x, y, z, y′, z′) are evaluated on the same grid. In the context of worker type we use
X = 20 grid points. The maximum worker type is given by x = 1 − 10−5 and the minimum is
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x = 10−5. To approximate the solution of integrals in the model we use Clenshaw-Curtis quadrature
and compute the weights to the nodes described by employing a Fast Fourier Transform. The code
is structured in three parts: (i) solving for the joint surplus of a match, (ii) finding the allocation
of types in unemployment and employment, and (iii) solving for wages.
The first step is to solve for the value of St(x, y, z), given by equation (4) in the main paper. Since
policy arrives at a Poisson rate, the problem is stationary between policy and announcement shocks.
Therefore there are five time periods, so that the size of the problem to solve is (5×20×20×20) =
40000. We start in the final period after the implementation of Hartz IV, an absorbing state, and
solve by backward induction. For each t we compute the solution to a fixed point problem that
depends on all other contemporaneous and future values of (x, y, z).
Next we solve for the allocation in different employment states. The economy is in steady-state
before the reform, so that we solve for the steady-state of u(x), e(x, y, z) and e(x, y, z, y′, z′). The
final object is large, (20×20×20×20×20) = 3.2×106, but as we only need to solve for this in ex-
post simulations the computation expense is minimal. We then solve for the differential equations
defining u̇t(x), ėt(x, y, z) and ėt(x, y, z, y
′, z′), inputing the policy and announcement shocks as they
were implemented in reality.
The final step is to compute wages. This is an explicit expression that only requires completion of
the first step. Wages vary according to whether the worker’s best outside option is unemployment or
employment and the types of the best outside offers. Wages also vary with respect to the employed
worker type in a given firm and match type, and according to which of the five time periods the
worker was hired in. This leaves a total number of unique wages as (5× 20× 20× 20) + (5× 20×
20 × 20 × 20 × 20) ≈ 1.6 × 107. After computing this last step, moments and simulated data can
be produced.
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A.11 Calibration of the Pecuniary Value of Home Production
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
Notes: The pecuniary value of home production is calculated as the average income received by the
unemployed in the SIAB data sample, and refers to the log of daily income received in Euros, deflated by
the Consumer Price Index and seasonally adjusted.
A.12 Fit of Wage Distributions
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
Notes: The solid black line represents a kernel density plot of the data. Similarly, the solid blue line is a
kernel density plot of simulated data derived from the model. The dashed blue line is a kernel density plot
of simulated data that has not been top-coded.
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